Liberalism and nationalism by Kelly, Paul
  
Kelly, Paul 
Liberalism and nationalism 
 
Book section 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Kelly, Paul (2015) Liberalism and nationalism. In: Wall, Steven, (ed.) The Cambridge Companion 
to Liberalism. Cambridge Companions to Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
UK. ISBN 978110743941 
 
© 2015 Cambridge University Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/61133/ 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2015 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s submitted version of the book section. There may be differences 
between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the publisher’s 
version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
1 
 
Liberalism and Nationalism 
Paul Kelly 
 
Liberalism and Nationalism are two distinct ideologies that emerged in Europe 
following the French Revolution, although both have deeper roots in European 
intellectual history. These ideologies continue to characterize and shape 
political developments into the twenty-first century and remain a concern of 
contemporary liberal political theorists such as Hayek, Berlin, Rawls, Taylor 
Miller and Tamir who wrestle with the extent to which they are complimentary 
or antithetical. There have certainly been liberal philosophers in the twentieth 
century who have seen nationalism as one of the most potent threats to 
liberalism. Yet there have been self-proclaimed liberal nationalists, and some of 
the most important figures of nineteenth and twentieth century European 
liberalism such as John Stuart Mill, Max Weber and Isaiah Berlin have been 
sympathetic to the importance of national identity. There have also been 
national-liberal political parties in western democracies. This essay will explore 
the diverse responses to national claims within the liberal tradition and the 
extent to which these two perspectives can be reconciled. 
 
The history of liberalism and liberal ideas and the history of nationalism 
provide ample opportunities to confuse and conflate any exclusive definition of 
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each complex tradition or theory. Nevertheless, one can profit by using John 
Breuilly’s characterization of nationalism as involving three distinct positions; 
that nations as groups exist; that they have value to their members and in 
themselves and that because of this value they have a claim to some form of 
political autonomy.1 A definition of liberalism is equally controversial but using 
the structure of Breuilly’s analysis whilst replacing nation with individual, to 
characterize liberalism is instructive. Although liberal theorists differ over how 
far liberalism is fundamentally a social theory or a substantive ethical and 
political philosophy both positions acknowledge that it is individualist: that it 
regards individuals as real; as having fundamental value and in consequence 
that individuals have a claim to moral and political self-determination usually 
characterized in terms of rights to freedom and equality.  
 
The debate about the compatibility of liberalism and nationality has been at the 
heart of the philosophical disputes between individualists and communitarians 
and between cosmopolitanism and particularism as approaches to political 
rights and values. This essay will also address the extent to which these 
distinctions show that liberalism and nationalism are antinomies or merely 
dichotomies of a larger whole.  
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To make sense of the recent debates between liberalism and nationality it is 
necessary to explore the philosophical sources of liberalism before its 
emergence as an ideology in the nineteenth century and then examine the way 
in which national identity is incorporated into the liberal political thought 
through the particular examples of John Stuart Mill2 and Lord Acton. This 
history sets the context for Isaiah Berlin’s3 rehabilitation of nationality within 
liberal theory and its use by contemporary liberal philosophers such as David 
Miller, Charles Taylor, Will Kymlicka and Yael Tamir who have sought to 
emphasize national identity against the perceived individualistic 
cosmopolitanism of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.   
 
The paper will conclude by arguing that the Berlin inspired reconciliation of 
liberalism and nationality is unsustainable and the Rawls’s notion of a Law of 
Peoples4 provides a better account of the claims of political community with 
liberalism than that of liberal nationalists without at the same time collapsing 
into an unrealistic form of cosmopolitanism. 
 
Pre-national Liberalism 
 
As an ideology, liberalism emerged in Europe in the wake of the French 
Revolution but as a philosophical approach to politics it originated in the 
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eighteenth century. It would be naïve and anachronistic to claim that Locke, 
Kant, Hume and Smith were liberals in any straightforward sense it is 
nevertheless possible to identify sources of liberalism in the complex 
philosophies of each thinker.5 These four thinkers help to identify two distinct 
strands in the development of liberal thought that have a bearing on the way in 
which groups are accommodated within a liberal theory and importantly how 
the idea of nationality features within liberalism. It is worth bearing in mind 
that the modern concept of a nation was unavailable to all four thinkers.  
 
John Locke and Immanuel Kant are two familiar sources of liberalism as an 
ethical or moralistic approach to politics and are used as ideal types by 
contemporary libertarian and egalitarian philosophers to explain and defend 
their respective theories of justice or individual rights. Both Locke and Kant 
distil and transform an earlier tradition of natural jurisprudence that sought to 
explain political authority and the claims of individuals in respect of it. 
Although Locke’s contract theory appears to provide a text-book account of 
the construction of political institutions by pre-political individuals agreeing to 
transfer their natural and moral powers his theory is actually much more 
complex. Contract theory is methodologically and ethically individualist and it 
is this feature that is at the heart of liberalism. Individuals are the basis of social 
institutions and practices and are therefore ontologically prior to social 
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institutions and associations. This is often considered a hopelessly naïve 
sociology: a fact appreciated by Locke who tries to draw the sting from just 
such a critique offered by Sir Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha in the first of his Two 
Treatises of Civil Government. Yet although Locke is an individualist his main 
concern is not explaining the origin of political institutions but instead he is 
concerned with justifying and legitimizing political authority in the face of pre-
social individual rights and liberties. These rights and liberties are real but they 
are indeterminate in the absence of authority and institutions that can 
adjudicate and enforce rights claims. Kant, although not strictly a contract 
theorist, also extends aspects of this individualistic account of the state even 
further in using the idea of public right as the basis for the juridical state that 
confers determinacy on individuals’ private right claims. The modern state is 
required by the existence of individuals who share a common space (in Kant’s 
sense a finite globe) and who make claims of right as part of exercising agency. 
Kant and Locke are therefore concerned with the idea of a juridical entity and 
its normative authority and legitimacy and not with the origins of actual 
political institutions. Indeed Locke’s account of the contractual emergence of 
political authority and the state is accompanied by a separate historical 
sociology of the emergence of political societies.6 Kant’s position is also neutral 
on the historical emergence of actual political communities. Although Locke 
and Kant do not deny the existence of intermediate institutions between the 
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individual and the state they account for these in individual terms and most 
importantly they do not regard such intermediate institutions or associations as 
having a normative status that is irreducible to the rights and ethical status of 
the individuals who compose them. Two things follow from this. First, there is 
no normative role for a nation in Locke and Kant’s political theory. Both 
acknowledge the idea of a people and attach significance to it in their 
international political theory,7 but in each case it is clear that this is a juridical 
entity that is coextensive with the state or political community. To suggest, as 
does Meisels, that a territorially bounded juridical community is a root of the 
nation8 is misleading and potentially leaves the concept of nation to be so 
broad as to be meaningless. Second, the idea of a state derived from individual 
rights and liberties as either a philosophical presupposition or as a practical 
implication exhausts the idea of political community. The ethically individualist 
liberalism that can be derived from natural jurisprudence and which is 
exemplified in the political thought of Locke and Kant is primarily a ‘state-
focused’ political theory where the state is the implication of a philosophy of 
rights, obligations, and their sanctioning powers. Any accommodation between 
this variant of liberalism and national identity must therefore subordinate the 
claims of nation to the prior ethical and political claims of individuals as rights 
bearers. Yet the juridical individualism of Locke and Kant also challenges any 
simplistic identification of liberalism with a universalist-cosmopolitanism that 
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claims that the primary obligations of individuals are to all other individuals 
irrespective of geographical and cultural distance. Both Locke and Kant 
acknowledge that there are ethically significant political communities that are 
not straightforwardly captured with the idea of a voluntary association, but they 
regard these as features of a complex moral economy of individual rights and 
liberties and not as implications of fundamental ethical communities as moral 
particularists claim.   
 
As we have seen this juridical source of liberal individualism in natural 
jurisprudence can accommodate an historical and sociological account of 
political communities but it subordinates this to the prior logic of moral norms. 
But the liberal tradition also involves a different account of liberalism as a 
social theory as opposed to an ethical philosophy.  This social theory tradition 
is closely associated with the ideas of David Hume and Adam Smith, although 
as with Locke and Kant one must again caution against a simplistic claim that 
Hume and Smith are liberals.  
 
Hume and Smith have accounts of liberty, rights and legitimate institutions but 
unlike the tradition of natural jurisprudence they do not assert the priority of 
these normative claims but instead provide accounts of the emergence of moral 
and political practices and norms as consequences of un-coerced social 
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interaction. Hume challenges the tradition of natural jurisprudence with his 
naturalistic philosophy and conventionalist account of the emergence of private 
property, promise keeping and the associated artificial virtue of justice.9 
Government in turn, also evolves to support and enforce the sanctions of 
justice when society becomes more complex and the opportunity to avoid the 
consequences of non-compliance with societal norms arises. Hume argues that 
the simple idea of the evolution of conventions provides the basis for the 
norms that characterize moral and political life. Hume turns from philosophy 
to history in his later works10 and develops an historical account of freedom in 
the context of the particular institutions of the English constitution. Hume’s 
idea that a system of liberty emerges as a complex social practice and not as a 
serious of rational deductions from normative premises gave rise to a 
conception of conjectural history that is developed and expanded in the work 
of other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers such as his friend Adam Smith.  
 
Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence11 provides an anthropological account of law 
and government emerging through four stages of development from a 
primitive hunter-gatherer lifestyle through pastoral and agricultural forms of 
society and into the fourth and final stage of commercial or civil society. Each 
stage involves a greater degree of social complexity through a process of 
historical and cultural evolution. Smith’s social anthropology and conjectural 
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history provides a developmental account of liberty as a social practice 
exemplified in a society of private property, security of contract and 
commercial exchange. Smith’s account of liberty is essentially negative as it 
emphasizes a neutral role of government as a guarantor of the system of natural 
liberty through its provision of defense against external enemies and its 
protection of property and the rule of law. As with the tradition of natural 
jurisprudence and contract theory the role of the government is to enforce the 
law and punish infractions of the rights and liberties of its subjects, but the 
crucial difference is that these liberties are the result of an evolving social 
system. The key to maintaining that social system of natural liberty involved 
maintaining the balance between institutions within society. For Smith the 
emphasis is on civil society, commerce and trade as the ultimate guarantors of 
natural liberty and not the primacy of a sovereign state. Society is not 
equivalent to the state and Smith is more concerned with the role and scope of 
government than with theorizing the state as a juridical implication of natural 
and fundamental rights or ethical claims.  
 
Hume and Smith provide a model of a liberal order as a commercial society 
where the boundaries between polities are porous and open to trade and 
commerce rather than a closed juridical system of rights. This model does not 
deny that individuals have particular attachments or that they find significance 
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in the fellowship of other individuals in groups and associations, but it does 
deny a place for intermediate natural communities of significance such as 
nations which have a natural claim of authority over individuals. Indeed, it was 
argued, the idea of commerce as the spread of material culture and civilization 
had a tendency to break down barriers between people and establish 
relationships of interdependence and mutual regard which undermined classical 
ideas of republican liberty and solidarity. And it was precisely for this reason 
that Rousseau, a contemporary and correspondent of Smith, considered the 
ideas of commerce and trade as incompatible with the maintenance of a general 
will.12 The theorists of civil society, such as Smith, who shaped the ideas of 
classical liberalism emphasized liberty in opposition to government and saw the 
state as a necessary instrument for enforcing contract and property rights but 
not as the expression of a popular will or as constituting a people: the state as 
the institutions of government and the law fits within the idea of society and is 
not coextensive with it. Similarly the boundaries of society are merely accidental 
and contingent having a particular history, and at least according to these 
thinkers they were likely to become less important as trade and commerce 
established social connections amongst those previously isolated.  
 
Although neither Locke, Kant nor Smith deny the possibility of individuals 
associating into groups that are distinguished by language and tradition, they do 
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not provide any ethical or sociological support for the view that nations are real 
entities of any kind in the same way that they insist that individuals are real 
entities both methodologically and ethically. Concepts such as territoriality, 
sovereignty, self-determination and ‘people’ many appear to serve as building 
blocks for nationalism or the vehicle through which national identity is 
exercised, but they need not be seen as place-holders for a nationalist 
completion of an abstract and incomplete liberal theory as we can see when 
these ideas return to the centre of liberal political philosophy in the twentieth 
century. Yet for much of the intervening period nationalist critics of liberalism 
starting with Herder in 1790s, and some liberal nationalists made precisely the 
claim that liberalism was abstract and incomplete without the addition of the 
reality of national identity and national groups. 
 
Mill and the rise of liberal nationalism 
 
Herder developed a counter-enlightenment critique of universal rationalism and 
an ideal of cultural history that was to profoundly affect many early nineteenth-
century Romantic thinkers because of his theories about the expressive role of 
language and the concept of culture as the expression of the natural unit of a 
nation.13 The idea that language is a vehicle that expresses the collective life of 
mankind has influenced contemporary thinkers such as Isaiah Berlin and 
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Charles Taylor and has played a role in the development of contemporary 
communitarian critiques of individualistic liberalism. 
 
Much of Herder’s cultural nationalism was aesthetic as opposed to political, but 
it influenced subsequent philosophers such as J.G. Fichte (1762-1814) in the 
wake of the French Revolution and it captured the spirit of national liberation 
that was unleashed in the wake of Napoleon’s assault on the ancien regime 
powers and in the anti-French reaction to Napoleonic imperialism. With the 
defeat of Napoleon and the attempt to reestablish an imperial order in Europe 
the struggles of peoples for national liberation and self-determination grew. 
Rising political leaders such as the Hungarian Lajos Kossuth (1802-94) in 
central Europe, Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-72) in Italy and Daniel O’Connell ‘the 
Liberator’ (1775-1847) in Britain, appealed to the concept of a nation as the 
basis for their struggle for independence from the pre-revolutionary imperial 
order. National struggles such as that of Greece against the Ottoman Empire 
inspired Romantic poets such as Lord Byron and political radicals such as 
Jeremy Bentham to campaign for rights to political self-determination, and in 
Byron’s case also inspired him to join the national struggle fighting against the 
Ottoman Turks.  Mazzini founded a group named Young Europe in 1834, 
which argued for a second revolution to extend national liberty and self-
determination as the earlier French Revolution had extended individual liberty. 
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Many of these new nationalist leaders drew on liberal ideas of political self-
determination and individual liberty in their struggles against the old order. The 
early nineteenth century rise in nationalist sentiment combined Romantic ideas 
of national identity and solidarity with liberal ideas of political liberty, individual 
freedom and constitutional government. Although the concept of the nation 
and national identity originated as an aesthetic critique of enlightenment 
rationalism and individualism in the writings of Herder it took the events 
following the collapse of the French Revolution in Europe and South America 
to bring liberalism and nationalism together as a political movement. Mazzini, 
Kossuth, O’Connell and Simon Bolivar in South America, were all influenced 
by liberal political ideas and espoused ambitions for liberal constitutional orders 
in place of political absolutism. Indeed for much of the early nineteenth 
century liberalism and nationalism were interconnected. This had an important 
impact on the subsequent development of liberal political theory and gave rise 
to the idea of liberal nationalism, an idea that is given its most forceful 
Anglophone statement in the nineteenth century in the political theory of John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873). 
 
Mill’s position in the liberal canon is unchallengeable yet deeply controversial. 
Mill’s On Liberty (1859) remains one of the iconic texts of the liberal canon yet 
his defense of liberty on utilitarian premises is potentially self-undermining. His 
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Principles of Political Economy (1848) is a classic statement of liberal political 
economy and remained a standard work in the field until the late nineteenth 
century, yet the chapters on socialism are also seen as marking a rupture in the 
classical liberal tradition that paved the way for the state interventionism of 
new liberalism.14 His utilitarianism, libertarianism and political economy all 
build upon the ideas of his liberal predecessors but Mill also famously drew on 
the thought of Romantic thinkers and developments in nineteenth century 
French and German philosophy. His 1861 Considerations on Representative 
Government is as important contribution to liberal engagement with the rise of 
democracy and develops the idea of representative democracy originated by 
Jeremy Bentham. Chapter xvi of this work marks an important milestone in 
liberal thinking about government and the state as it involves an explicit 
statement about the place of nationality. Mill writes:  
 
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are 
united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist 
between them and any others – which make them co-operate with each 
other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same 
government, and desire it should be government by themselves or a 
portion of themselves exclusively.15 
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He goes on to explain the origin of a spirit of nationality in terms of language, 
race or descent and possibly even geography, but most importantly he departs 
from purely essentialist accounts of national origins of the sort found in Herder 
and Fichte by focusing on the history of ‘political antecedents’, what one might 
re-describe as a political tradition. In the short opening section of chapter xvi 
Mill intimates many of the ideas that were to characterize accounts of liberal 
nationalism and theories of the place of nationality in twentieth-century liberal 
and democratic politics.  
 
For Mill nations are real in the sense of being groups and entities that act in the 
world and make political claims, but he also retains his methodological 
individualism by seeing nations as groups of individuals who share common 
ends, desires or preferences. Nationality works through the aspirations and 
beliefs of the individual members of groups and as such he rejects any 
methodological or ontological claim about the priority of national groups over 
individuals. In this respect he intimates the idea of ‘imagined communities’ 
developed by Benedict Anderson.16 Imagined communities (Mill uses the 
phrase ‘communities of recollection’) are real but they are real because they are 
thought into existence in the acts and discourse of those who use the idea of 
nationality as a ground of identification. There is no attempt to modify the 
ontological individualism that underpinned Locke’s and Kant’s conception of a 
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people or Smith’s moral and political economy: individualism remains central 
to Mill’s philosophy and to liberalism. But nor is there any need to modify or 
reject individualism as Mill simply combines the liberal idea of a people with 
the sociological or historical category of the nation: ‘Where the sentiment of 
nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the  
members of the nationality under the same government’.17 Mill’s argument also 
prefigures the later functionalist account of nationalism developed by the 
twentieth-century liberal sociologist Ernest Gellner.18 Gellner argued that 
nations are primarily a feature of modernity and are associated with the practice 
of state building. Nationality is a mechanism through which states consolidate 
their power; secure their legitimacy and seek to reproduce themselves. Mill 
explicitly links the idea of nationality to self-government but more importantly 
he uses the idea of the nation as a way of securing political stability and 
effective and efficient government. The wider point of chapter xvi was not 
simply to acknowledge the fact of nationality but to recognize how it could 
support a liberal representative government in the face of the rise of 
democracy. Mill saw nationality as a way of taming the more dangerous and 
destabilizing tendencies of a democratic order by tying together disparate 
individuals into a single political entity focused around a common set of self-
legitimizing institutions and practices. The liberal benefit of a national state is 
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that it made possible the minimization of coercive legitimation and made 
possible the liberal ideal of ‘soft’ or non-invasive government.19  
 
Where a nation existed and where it could sustain a minimally invasive and 
coercive political order Mill acknowledged that there should be a right of 
national self-determination as an extension of the general right of self-
government. Nevertheless he remains a liberal first and a nationalist second. 
Although nations have a prima facie claim to self-determination and self-
government they do not have a conclusive claim. Indeed Mill is often criticized 
by defenders of nationalism for an arbitrary distinction between the nations 
that he approves of and which should have rights to self-determination and 
those nations he is critical of which should subordinate themselves to dominant 
nations. Minority nations that have been absorbed into larger nation-states such 
as the Bretons or Basques in France or the Welsh and highland Scotch in 
Britain are described as ‘inferior and backward’ and Mill suggests that such 
nations should be assimilated into the privileges of a ‘civilised and highly 
cultured people’. All nations are not equal and he makes no claim that they 
should all enjoy the same rights and privileges. Mill’s support for a hierarchy 
among nations is consistent with his views about the differential development 
of peoples and his controversial views about the educative and progressive role 
of British imperial rule in India.20  
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Acton and the Liberal reaction to Liberal Nationalism 
 
Mill’s liberal accommodation of nationality established a paradigm of liberal 
nationalism that has been developed and defended by some contemporary 
liberals, but it would be incorrect to see his position as the sole dominant 
strand of liberal discourse on the nation in nineteenth-century Anglophone 
thought and the later liberal tradition. Mill’s utilitarian liberal nationalism was 
one of the subjects of Lord Acton’s essay on ‘Nationality’21 in which Acton 
mounts a liberal critique of liberalism and the idea that states and nations 
should be combined in single entities. 
 
Acton (1834-1902) is a curious figure in English liberalism coming from an old 
recusant Catholic family: being educated into a European Catholic culture and 
civilisation does not look a promising context for a defender of free 
institutions. Yet despite Acton’s Catholicism he was a close correspondent of 
the great liberal W.E. Gladstone and was thoroughly integrated into English 
liberal culture, which he celebrated in his historical writings, contrasting English 
liberalism with rationalist anti-clerical liberalism inspired by the French 
Enlightenment. Acton acknowledged the importance of national identity as an 
historical artifact but he criticized the way in which elites used an abstract and 
artificial conception of the nation to construct an ideology of nationalism and 
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to assert that it alone should be the principle of unity within a state. It was 
precisely this point that brought Acton to criticize Mill’s argument that all 
members of a nation have a prima facie claim to be brought under one 
government. Acton saw Mill’s argument as a threat to freedom and a liberal 
order by its strengthening of the power of government and the state and by its 
single criterion of political inclusion. Against this partisan idea of state 
nationalism Acton asserted the importance of political pluralism and suggested 
that multi-nation states such as Great Britain and Austria-Hungary were more 
likely to ensure political and individual liberty than states with an homogenous 
national culture which in most cases will be a dominant culture imposed upon 
minorities. It was for this reason that he supported the Confederacy against the 
Union in the United States’ Civil War. 
 
Acton’s liberalism reflects the conception of civil and commercial society as an 
evolving order of natural liberty familiar from Smith and the Scottish theorists 
of commercial society rather than the political monism of the social contract 
tradition in Locke or Kant. Although Acton’s Catholicism ensured that he 
remained committed to a universal natural law he rejected the modernist 
tendency of post Hobbesian contract theorists to connect the law of nature 
with the modern sovereign state. A liberal order was not achieved by the rise of 
a system of sovereign states and the consolidation of state power but by plural 
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order of powers within and between states that balanced and dispersed political 
power. Where Mill feared the rise of the democratic masses and their capture 
of the state, Acton saw the rising power of the state as the primary problem. 
Freedom was essentially a social order of dispersed power and not ultimately a 
condition of individuals under a sovereign state. The latter was a confidence 
trick performed by absolutists such as Hobbes and Bodin and which had 
deceived the likes of Locke, Kant and their successors such as Bentham and 
John Stuart Mill. As a Catholic Acton’s political sensibility was partly shaped by 
his membership of a recently oppressed minority in Britain and a culture that 
challenged the idea of the primacy of state sovereignty as a recent modernist 
invention that threatened a culture of freedom rather than guaranteeing it: he 
was the author of two provocatively titled essays on the idea of freedom in  
antiquity and freedom in the Christian world which show that freedom has 
evolved and developed and is not the gift of the modern sovereign state.22 The 
state remained the greatest threat to freedom and the biggest danger from the 
state was its capture and domination by a partial faction or elite. For Acton the 
post revolutionary rise of nationalism represented precisely this threat against 
the traditional orders and institutions that balanced and limited state power. 
 
By the end the nineteenth century the Millian paradigm of liberal nationalism 
had apparently won against the liberal pluralism of Acton, becoming the 
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dominant liberal discourse especially following the policy of the US President 
Woodrow Wilson to advance liberal nationalism in the face of the break up of 
the continental European empires in the Versailles Treaty after the First World 
War. The redrawing of the European map, and that of the Middle East 
following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, applied the Millian and 
Wilsonian idea that states and nations should converge (except in the case of 
the Kurds which became a source of instability to the present day).  But the 
consequences of the Wilsonian settlement also precipitated a liberal challenge 
to liberal nationalism that reflected Acton’s liberal pluralism. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly some of the most forceful twentieth century liberal critics of 
nationalism were Austrians such as F.A. Hayek and Karl Popper.  
 
Hayek and Popper developed their political philosophies in the context of the 
collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the rise of state nationalism in 
central Europe. Following the Second World War they both became prominent 
liberal critics of totalitarianism, but whilst this was primarily directed against the 
threat of soviet communism Hayek in particular also challenged the idea of 
nationalism as a threat to a liberal international order. In The Road to Serfdom 
(1944) Hayek directs his attention at Nazism arguing that it combined socialism 
with nationalism. Where many critics of Nazism have tended to down-play the 
role of nationalism in the face of the peculiar version of genocidal racism that 
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led to the Jewish holocaust, Hayek was quite clear that nationalism was a 
central and dangerous element of totalitarianism which challenged the idea of 
an open international order by its principle of national uniformity as a criterion 
of collective organization and inclusion. Hayek’s critique of nationalism is 
similar to that of Acton, indeed Hayek was quite explicit about his intellectual 
debt to Acton in the development of his mature liberal theory in The 
Constitution of Liberty (1960).23 As a theorist of liberalism as a spontaneous 
order that is undermined by the imposition of arbitrary and partial political 
conception of a collective good, Hayek’s social theory could only regard 
national identity as an artificial construction imposed on a people. That said, 
like Acton he did not deny the existence national fellow-feeling, the problem 
was not the matter of fact, which Hayek could hardly deny although he was 
skeptical of claims about its significance, but the way in which it was used to 
justify a partial collective ideology. Where the Millian paradigm had elided the 
social fact of national identity and fellow-feeling with the normative claims of 
the sovereign state, Acton and Hayek rejected this strategy as a false ideological 
form of politics. The struggle within liberalism over the place of national 
identity remains a special case of the struggle over the place of the state in a 
liberal order. Mill and Acton, just as Locke and Smith hold opposite positions 
in that debate. Hayek’s position alongside Acton and Smith has placed him 
outside the main debates within academic liberalism following Isaiah Berlin and 
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John Rawls who return the discussion of liberalism to the context of a juridical 
state.  
 
Liberal cosmopolitanism and the critique of liberal nationalism 
 
The experience of mid-twentieth century European history as mediated 
through the writings of classical liberals such has Hayek, has been unpromising 
for liberal nationalism. The debate about the compatibility between nationality 
and liberal values has returned to the heart of liberal political theory since the 
1990s and has been spear-headed by David Miller, Will Kymlicka, Yael Tamir, 
Charles Taylor and Margaret Moore all of whom can be situated in debates that 
are inspired by two dominant late twentieth-century political philosophers, 
Isaiah Berlin and John Rawls.  
 
Berlin is one of the most elusive of contemporary liberal political philosophers; 
a passionate defender of negative liberty and value pluralism through works 
that purport to be the history of ideas; he is a critic of nationalism as a 
manifestation of the politics of resentment but he is at the same time a 
defender of national identity and national belonging.24 Some scholars have 
explained Berlin’s sympathy for liberalism and the value of national identity in 
his own conflicted attempts to reconcile his adopted Englishness with his 
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Latvian Jewish background and later Zionism.25 Although there is a danger in 
biographical reductionism, Berlin’s own philosophical position is not 
incompatible with such interpretations. Berlin was an anti-systematic political 
thinker as befits his philosophical training in Oxford realism and ordinary 
language philosophy. Political philosophy is necessarily a second-order 
reflection of a first-order moral and political language that is given by 
experience, tradition and practice and not derived from pure reason. It is not a 
science and does not have its own peculiar body of knowledge. The political 
theorist’s task is to analyse and explain the origins of that political language and 
this involves the deployment of philosophical (or logico-linguistic) analysis and 
historical reflection and criticism. This involves the task of sifting through our 
moral and political experience to make the best possible sense of it. This 
attention to the grammar of a political or moral language can nevertheless draw 
our attention to features of moral and political experience that do not fit with 
systematization or logical coherence. For Berlin, one of the facts of moral 
experience is the ubiquity of conflict at the level of values and commitments, 
thus it is by no means incoherent to value both liberal principles and recognize 
the claims of national belonging. Indeed one of Berlin’s criticisms of 
nationalism is that it reduces national sentiment to a single exclusive or 
monistic ideology.  
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Berlin’s value pluralism is also manifest in his preoccupation with the ideas of 
anti-liberal and anti-enlightenment thinkers;26 many of whom shape the 
development of Romanticism and nationalist politics in the nineteenth century 
and who influence the communitarian philosophy of some of Berlin’s more 
famous students such as Charles Taylor.27 Although he remains a liberal in 
politics and personal life, Berlin’s recognition of the significance of national 
identity inspired other Jewish liberal political philosophers such as Avishai 
Margalit, Joseph Raz and most importantly Yael Tamir to develop complex 
perfectionist versions of liberalism. Berlin’s impact on Tamir’s book Liberal 
Nationalism28 is openly acknowledged and profound, yet Tamir pursues the 
relationship between liberal values and national (particularly in her case Zionist 
national) identity in much greater depth including the vexed political claims to 
recognition and self-determination. 
 
Tamir addresses the issue of national self-determination by distinguishing 
between a cultural and a political claim and suggests that many nationalists 
conflate the two. The former acknowledges the importance of culture as a 
source of identity, values and language whereas the latter connects these with 
exclusive control of territory and collective political agency. Furthermore, she 
acknowledges the ubiquity of cultural pluralism within modern states. From 
these two premises she concludes that the recognition of national identity does 
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not entail a claim or a right to political self-determination. As such she 
acknowledges the force of the liberal criticism of the nationalist’s claim to 
reconcile national culture with political and territorial claims of the sort that 
underpinned Wilsonian nationalism, whilst at the same time not denying the 
importance of national belonging within individual and social identity. Mill’s 
liberal nationalism had only ever asserted a contingent connection between the 
existence of national identity and political autonomy: Tamir’s argument is not 
just a more forceful assertion of that contingency, instead she refocuses 
attention on nationalism as a form of culturalism, thus linking her argument 
with liberal multiculturalists such as Will Kymlicka. Similarly she does not deny 
the third element of Breuilly’s typology of nationalism she just redirects 
attention from a narrow identification of nation and state to address other ways 
of accommodating national cultural claims such as providing internal 
protections and through the distribution of resources within a state. Tamir’s 
argument is thus consistent with the fundamental perspective of post Berlinian 
liberal theory which takes the statist character of the domain of politics for 
granted and sees the task of the political theorist in moralistic terms as the 
justification of norms of distribution within pre-existing states. This Berlinian 
inspired liberal nationalism challenges the individualistic cosmopolitanism of 
Hayek and classical liberals which attach no great significance to culture and 
identity. This is also the background presupposition of another great 
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contemporary liberal philosopher John Rawls although Rawls is often 
considered a target of contemporary liberal nationalism as he inspires a more 
radical liberal cosmopolitanism that undermines the significance of states, 
nations and cultures in its Kantian focus on free and equal individuals and their 
rights.  
 
Rawls’ three great works of political philosophy make virtually no reference to 
the idea of nationality29 and his theory of justice returns to the social contract 
tradition of Locke and Kant. Like Berlin, from whom he drew some 
inspiration, Rawls does not offer a theory of the state or an account of the 
political processes through which real politics manifests itself. Instead, the task 
of the political philosopher is reduced to an ethical one of regulating the 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. To this end 
Rawls argues that social or distributive justice is the first virtue of political 
institutions and the primary concern of political philosophers. Consequently, 
Rawls cannot have anything to say about the justness of a state system or how 
territory should be divided between states and national groups: all of these 
issues are either presupposed as settled or are outside the scope of 
philosophical resolution.  It is precisely this denial of the place of national 
identity that has encouraged political philosophers who are sympathetic to the 
issue of social justice to reintroduce the claims of nation and nationality into 
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liberal arguments. Foremost amongst these is David Miller who argues that 
Rawls either, presupposes an established national community, or requires the 
cultivation of national identity to motivate the form of redistribution that social 
justice requires.30 Miller’s argument ranges beyond commentary on Rawls and 
advances an account of national identity as both a political fact and a basis for 
social and political cohesion within a modern state, but he differs importantly 
from Tamir in acknowledging that national identity can form the basis of 
political rights and that these curtail the individualist cosmopolitanism that 
some commentators have argued follows from Rawls’s theory of justice as 
fairness.31  
 
Rawls’s apparent failure to acknowledge that he presupposes a territorially 
defined national political community at the heart of his theory of social justice 
is not the only reason why his theory has attracted criticism from liberal 
nationalism, a further reason is provided by the original choice situation in 
which his two principles of justice are identified. A Theory of Justice employs 
the idea of a social contract in two important senses. Firstly, the social contract 
is a metaphor for a political society as a scheme of social cooperation agreed 
between individuals who differ about fundamental ends and goals. In other 
words it assumes that the common good is the problem and therefore that it 
cannot be presupposed as a way of solving problems of social cooperation. To 
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this extent Rawls repeats Berlin’s claim about the ubiquity of pluralism. The 
social contract also functions as a device for choosing or legitimating the two 
principles that he claims constitute justice as fairness. To this end he imagines 
an original choice situation in which representative individuals choose the 
principles that govern the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation. To ensure that they do not merely choose what is in their narrow 
self-interest they are required to choose behind a hypothetical veil of ignorance 
that denies them knowledge about their specific conception of the good, but 
also crucially about features of their particular identity. Thus individuals would 
know nothing about their, gender, culture, religion (if they have one) or 
nationality.  
 
This model of individual choice behind a veil of ignorance has inspired a rival 
tradition of communitarian criticism often associated with thinkers such as 
Charles Taylor. The communitarian critics claim that choosers or selves who 
are unencumbered by the elements of their identity denied to them behind the 
veil of ignorance, would either not be able to choose at all, or more importantly 
they would cease to be selves or individuals in any recognizable sense. For 
communitarians we are constituted as selves through identity conferring 
practices such as culture, morality, nation, religion, and without these there 
would be no individuals. This argument often called the ‘social thesis’, claims 
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that our identities are socially constituted and that the isolated individual of 
classical liberal theory, especially that of Locke and Kant is a mere 
philosopher’s fiction or an abstraction taken too far. Although some 
communitarians have taken this argument to undermine liberalism, many 
liberals have sought to accommodate the social thesis within liberal discourse. 
It can be found at the heart of Tamir’s defence of the importance of national 
identity and in Will Kymlicka’s arguments for cultural recognition and 
protection in his liberal multiculturalism. As we have seen this argument also 
reflects Berlin’s rejection of an ‘inner citadel’ view of the liberal self and his 
commitment to cultural and value pluralism. If the cultural sources of self-
identity are preconditions of autonomous choice then liberals need to cultivate 
and protect those valuable contexts of choice as a condition of a liberal and 
autonomous lives. Rawls is therefore criticized for being too Kantian and anti-
perfectionist in his conception of liberalism. Liberal nationalism positions itself 
as a modest liberal communitarian position that avoids the desiccated 
individualism of Rawls’ Kantian liberal cosmopolitanism. 
 
The argument thus far has been to show how the liberal nationalist argument 
has become interwoven with the discussion of two of the most important 
recent liberal political philosophies, what has not been done is assess whether 
this engagement has enhanced liberal theory or weakened the claims of nation 
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within liberalism. In the closing part of this section I will argue that the 
concessions contemporary liberal nationalists have won in these arguments are 
either weak or non-existent. 
 
Kymlicka and Tamir both deploy the culturalist or ‘social thesis’ argument to 
support the claims of national identity and whilst this makes a good point 
about the social context of choice and identity formation it can at best make 
nationalism a contingent element in that process. When confronted by the 
claims of rival nations in the context of multi-nation states, or when having to 
adjudicate between the claims of national recognition and of social justice, 
egalitarian liberals such as Kymlicka and Tamir side with universalist-liberal 
values over the claims of nation or of culture. Tamir’s cultural theory offers a 
weak defense of the nation as her liberalism requires the priority of just 
treatment and where liberalism has to choose between culture and freedom or 
equality, it will always chose the latter values. If all that is being claimed is that 
liberalism can accommodate liberal versions of nationalism then the point is 
true but trivial. If something stronger is being claimed on behalf of national 
identity then the culturalist argument for national recognition becomes more 
problematic. Miller and Moore32 do indeed make stronger claims for national 
recognition, although Miller’s recognition of claims to rights to national self-
determination or secession is heavily qualified, but they face the problematic 
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challenge of why national cultural claims should automatically trump the claims 
of other cultural groups. The argument that national identity is special and prior 
to other group identities because it creates the bases of solidarity that sustain 
functioning states and democracies is open to the challenge that it is either 
circular or false as it defines as a nation whatever holds a state together 
including in multi-nation states such as the UK or states like the US where the 
idea of the nation is largely meaningless unless it refers to constitutional 
patriotism. If we interpret the nation in liberal nationalism to be so broad as to 
accommodate the ideal of constitutional patriotism or the bases of political 
obligation in a stable multi-nation state such as the UK, then we exhaust it of 
any explanatory content and contradict precisely the claims of the culturalist 
argument deployed by Tamir, Kymlicka and ultimately Berlin, which sees a 
richer tradition of language and culture at the heart of national identity.  
 
Yet in rejecting the claims of nationality within liberalism we should not 
assume that this consigns liberalism to a desiccated cosmopolitan individualism 
or a universalist utopia. In weaving between individualist cosmopolitanism and 
national particularism in his last work, John Rawls recovers the idea of a law of 
peoples to regulate a global order. The Law of Peoples is a short, pregnant and 
complex work which recovers ideas that are at the origins of liberalism in the 
ideas of Locke and Kant. Rawls’s primary task is to extend the contractarian 
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perspective of his political liberalism to the international and global realm and 
show why he posits a two level contract theory – between individuals within 
political communities and between peoples at the global and international level 
– rather than through the global extension of his idea of a closed domestic 
society as some of his cosmopolitan followers had argued. At the heart of the 
second level of contract is the notion of a people which is distinct from the 
idea of an existing state or a nation. The crucial point is that both existing states 
and nations may count as peoples but such an overlap is wholly contingent as 
the idea of a people is a normative and juridical category. In choosing to 
conceptualise political communities and there interrelationships in terms of a 
law of peoples Rawls recovers the tradition of Locke and Kant which 
distinguishes between the moral and juridical conceptualization of political 
relationships and the historical or anthropological facts of political experience. 
It is precisely this distinction that is overlooked by contemporary liberal 
nationalism. Furthermore, by acknowledging the idea of a political community 
between the individual and the global realm, the juridical idea of a people 
undercuts the nationalist claim that liberalism is too preoccupied with 
individuals and their rights to make sense of political experience. 
 
Conclusion 
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Liberalism and nationalism are at best uneasy companions. Liberalism’s social 
ontology denies the primacy of nationality as an account of political community 
and its ethical theory denies the moral primacy of nation or any other kind of 
community or association above the claims of individuals to equal concern and 
respect. Consequently liberalism can only accommodate the claims for national 
recognition on liberal terms. As we have seen that does not deny that the 
national fellow-feeling of a liberal people sustains the free institutions and 
personal rights and liberties of a liberal order. All that said, the positive 
relationship between liberal and national ideals and values is politically 
contingent and in the long run unstable, although how unstable is an historical 
and empirical as opposed to a philosophical question. Some liberal theorists 
assumed that the logic of liberalism is that of a cosmopolitan order where the 
personal liberty and free movement of individuals dilute the ties of identity 
groups and national identity. It is precisely for this reason that nationalist 
politics often involves language protection policies, special social provision and 
other restrictions on individual behavior to sustain the bases of national identity 
from the challenge of cosmopolitan culture and economic globalization. These 
provisions can be benign although they clash with some core tenets of 
liberalism, but where they are benign they also have unfortunate consequences 
for national identity as the more a nation becomes a liberal civic nation the less 
significance the idea of national identity has as a source of solidarity.  This does 
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not mean that solidarity becomes less important for liberals but it does suggest 
that accounts of liberal solidarity can dispense with appeals to the social fact of 
national belonging and identity as their justification.  
 
Although liberalism can accommodate a place for national identity, where 
stronger claims are made for national identity, as in most traditional political 
nationalisms, the uneasy relationship completely breaks down. Liberalism 
cannot and need not support nationalist claims for the national communities to 
be states and for significant national groups to secede from existing states to 
achieve national self-determination. In the last analysis liberalism is a person-
regarding political philosophy and insofar as it needs to accommodate rights to 
group self-determination this must be for person-regarding reasons alone. Such 
arguments are not well served by being confused with ideas of nationalism or 
nationality. The challenge for liberalism remains the same as it was for the early 
precursors of liberalism such as Locke or Kant; to distinguish the legitimate 
claims of groups of individuals to organize their affairs collectively, from the 
idea that there are national communities which have a claim to recognition and 
self-determination that are not reducible to the rights and interests of their 
members. 
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